Judge Michael Nettles has issued an order granting County Administrator Rodney Berry’s petition for a writ of mandamus in the Treasurer’s complaint.
The order states:
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF DILLON
Jamie Calhoun Estes, as Treasurer of Dillon County,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Rodney Berry, as Administrator of Dillon County and In His Capacity as The Chief Officer of the Dillon County Government; Dillon County Board of Education; and Northeastern Technical College,
Defendants.
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS FOR DILLON COUNTY
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
C/A No.: 2017-CP-17-0351
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT RODNEY BERRY’S PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
THIS MATTER CAME BEFORE THE COURT on July 20, 2017, by way of a Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Motion for Temporary Injunction brought by Defendant Rodney Berry, Administrator of Dillon County pursuant to Rule 65, SCRCP seeking to require plaintiff Jamie Estes, Dillon County Treasurer, to carry out the prescribed ministerial duties of the County Treasurer. Berry’s Petition requests this Court direct “Plaintiff to fulfill her statutorily required duties and disburse funds as directed by the Dillon County Council in its budget for 2017-2018.”
Robert E. Tyson, Jr. and William H. Jordan appeared for Rodney Berry. Charles Curry appeared for Plaintiff, Jamie Estes, Treasurer, Dillon County. Bruce Davis appeared for Dillon County Board of Education and Charles Boykin for Northeastern Technical College.
For the reasons set forth below, I grant Defendant Berry’s Petition of Writ of Mandamus.
The Plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action challenging the validity of the ordinance approving the Dillon County Budget for 2017-2018. Plaintiff also seeks a declaratory ruling on two specific sections of the approved budget concerning the funding of the Dillon County Board of Education and Northeastern Technical College.
By letter dated July 11, 2017, Plaintiff’s counsel, Charles Curry, wrote the Dillon County attorney stating Plaintiff would not be disbursing any funds after Friday, July 14. Before the Treasurer would commence disbursing funds, the letter stated the County has several options, including filing a Petition for Writ of Mandamus. After her counsel sent this letter, Plaintiff modified her position and indicated she will disburse some funds, specifically payroll for county employees. At the hearing Plaintiff’s counsel indicated Plaintiff did process payroll. Neither Berry nor the citizens of Dillon County know which funds Plaintiff will or will not disburse.
Article V, Section 20 of the Constitution of South Carolina and Rule 65, SCRCP, authorize this Court to issue a Writ of Mandamus. A Mandamus is a remedial writ that courts issue to order a governmental official or agency to perform her/its ministerial duties. “Its principal function is to command and execute, and not to inquire and adjudicate; therefore, it is not the purpose of the writ to establish a legal right, but to enforce one which has already been established.” Wilimon v. Greenville, 243 S.C. 82, 132 S.E.2d 169, 171 (1963); see also Porter v. Jedziniak, 334 S.C. 16, 18, 512 S.E.2d 497 (1999) (“The primary purpose of a writ of mandamus is to enforce an established right and to enforce a corresponding imperative duty created or imposed by law”); Redmond v. Lexington County Sch. Dist. No. 4, 314 S.C. 431, 445 S.E.2d 441 (1994) (a writ of mandamus is not appropriate for a discretionary authority); Sanford v. S.C. State Ethics Comm’n, 385 S.C. 483, 493-494, 685 S.E.2d 600, 605-606 (2009); and Knight v. Austin 396 S.C. 518, 522, 722 S.E. 2d 802, 804 (2012).
For this Court to issue a Writ of Mandamus, the County must show;
(1) a duty of the Respondent[s] to perform the act; (2) the ministerial nature of the act; (3) the Petitioner’s specific legal right for which discharge of the duty is necessary; and (4) a lack of any other legal remedy. Wilson v. Preston, 378 S.C. at 354, 662 S.E.2d at 583. A ministerial act or duty is one which a person performs because of a legal mandate which is defined with such precision as to leave nothing to the exercise of discretion. Id. at 354, 662 S.E.2d at 583.
Edwards v. State, 383 S.C. 82, 96, 678 S.E.2d 412, 419 (2009); see also Sanford, 685 S.E.2d at 606.
In deciding whether to grant this Petition for Writ of Mandamus, I reviewed the four elements and concluded they are satisfied. Plaintiff has a duty to disburse fund; the disbursement of funds is a ministerial act; Berry and Dillon County have a legal right that Plaintiff perform her functions; and Berry lacks any other legal remedy.
First, Plaintiff has a duty to disburse funds. In fact, the treasurer has no greater function than to disburse funds as authorized by statute or ordinance.
The treasurer disburses funds as established in the Budget for Dillon County. County Council has the statutory responsibility to establish a budget and set the financial parameters for the County. See S.C. Code Ann. 4-9-30 (enumerating the broad powers of counties); S.C. Code Ann 4-9-25 (establishing that counties “have authority to enact … ordinances … respecting any subject as appears necessary and proper for the security, general welfare, and convenience of counties or for preserving health, peace, order, and good government in them” and recognizing that “[t]he powers of a county must be liberally construed in favor of the county”); S.C. Ann. 4-9-140 (County council shall adopt annually and prior to the beginning of the fiscal year operating and capital budgets for the operation of county government and shall in such budgets identify the sources of anticipated revenue including taxes necessary to meet the financial requirements of the budgets adopted.) Once Dillon County Council enacted the budget Ordinance, Plaintiff has certain mandatory or “ministerial” duties she must perform pursuant to the ordinance. The treasurer, like other government employees, must adhere to the budget parameters. Plaintiff does not have any discretionary authority to decide whether she will adhere to the budget; rather, she must comply with the budget.
Ordinances are presumed valid. See, e.g., State v. Roper, 274 S.C. 14, 18, 260 S.E.2d 705, 707 (1979); Huffman v. City of Columbia, 146 S.C. 436, 438, 144 S.E. 157, 159 (1928) (finding an ordinance that has been passed is “presumptively valid”). Determining whether a local ordinance is valid is a two-step process. The first step is to determine whether the municipality had the power to adopt the ordinance. If no power existed, the ordinance is invalid. If the municipality had the power to enact the ordinance, the second step is to determine whether the ordinance is consistent with the Constitution and general law of the State. Diamonds v. Greenville County, 325 S.C. 154, 480 S.E.2d 718 (1997); Bugsy’s, Inc. v. City of Myrtle Beach, 340 S.C. 87, 93, 530 S.E.2d 890, 893 (2000). Plaintiff will have her day in court on the merits of her argument but until then, she must continue to perform her responsibilities.
Disbursing funds is a ministerial act. In Wilson v. Preston, 378 S.C. at 354, 662 S.E.2d at 583, the Court defined a ministerial act or duty is one which a person performs because of a legal mandate which is defined with such precision as to leave nothing to the exercise of discretion. Id. at 354, 662 S.E.2d at 583. Disbursing funds is a mandatory function and not one of discretion. Plaintiff does not have discretion to determine when and to whom the county funds are disbursed.
It is paramount for Berry and Dillon County that Plaintiff discharge her duties. If she does not, Berry, the county government, and its citizens will be harmed by the arbitrary acts of Plaintiff. The public depends on the County to perform its legal responsibilities. Dillon County clearly has a legal right that its employees and public servants execute their job responsibilities. These actions by Plaintiff jeopardize the County and place the County at risk of further legal maladies.
Berry does not have another legal remedy. If Plaintiff does to disburse funds as required by law and County ordinances, Dillon County will fail to meet its financial obligations and it will be impossible to the County to undo the harm it will suffer. A writ of mandamus is necessary to protect the interests of the County and its citizens.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT:
1. A Writ of Mandamus is issued against the Plaintiff requiring her to disburse funds pursuant to the 2017-2018 budget approved by Dillon County Council. She is so directed until the Court makes a final determination as to the allegations raised in her complaint.
2. Plaintiff is required to hold in escrow an amount equal to the funds previously appropriated for the Dillon County Board of Education from the local option sales tax and the dollars appropriated for Northeastern Technical College. Treasurer shall escrow monthly 1/12th of the amounts allegedly owed Dillon County Board of Education. For Fiscal Year 2016-2017, the amount totaled $319,000. For Northeastern Technical College, the $114,000 is not allocated until November, thus no funds are required to be set aside. Treasurer shall set aside these funds until the court makes a final determination as to the allegations raised in the complaint.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED
Judge Michael G. Nettles
Twelfth Judicial Circuit